FAD PReP STRATEGY DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION OF PHASES AND TYPES OF A FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE OUTBREAK AND RESPONSE

FAD PReP

Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness & Response Plan

National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management

USDA

APHIS

the Center for Food Security & Public Health
Iowa State University®

United States Department of Agriculture • Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service • Veterinary Services

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GUIDELINES FOR CLASSIFICATION OF PHASES AND TYPES OF AN FMD OUTBREAK AND RESPONSE

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Version 1.7

The following guidelines are being developed as an aid for rapid decision making to facilitate response planning and development of business continuity plans in the event of a foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in the United States or North America.

INTRODUCTION

The size, structure, efficiency, and extensive movement inherent in the United States and North American livestock industries will present unprecedented challenges in the event of an FMD outbreak. Strategies for the response to, and management of, an FMD outbreak will change as the outbreak progresses and will depend upon the magnitude, location, other characteristics of the outbreak, and vaccine availability. At the beginning of an outbreak, or with a small outbreak, the highest priority is to take all measures possible to prevent disease spread, to stamp-out the disease as rapidly as possible, and to reestablish the United States as an FMD-free country. In an extensive outbreak of FMD, the highest priority is to ensure a secure food supply for the nation and the world by ensuring business continuity for food animal producers and all associated industries.

The impacts of disease spread from a small focal outbreak are extremely high, as compared to the cost of stop movement and destruction of limited numbers of animals. Whereas the impact of a complete stop movement and stamping-out policy are extremely high in an extensive outbreak as compared to the cost of limited further spread of FMD. These impacts must be weighed and the response strategies quickly adjusted as the outbreak unfolds.

Having pre-defined phases and potential types of an FMD outbreak will facilitate development of adaptable emergency response and business continuity plans for the U.S. livestock industry. The phase is a temporal stage in an FMD outbreak response, the type is a

categorical measure of magnitude of an FMD outbreak and its response.[1] The phase and type of the FMD outbreak is expected to change over time and could be designated by the authorities responsible for managing the response. Different regions of the United States or segments of the animal agriculture industry may be designated as being involved in different phases or types of an FMD outbreak simultaneously. Different species may have different recommendations regarding stamping-out and/or appropriate vaccination strategies.

A goal of the outbreak response will be to regain FMD-free status (either with or without vaccination) in order to resume exportation of animals and animal products. The internationally accepted standards for regaining FMD-free status are found in the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) Terrestrial Animal Health Code (TAHC) (http://www.oie.int/international-standard-setting/terrestrial-code/access-online/). Reference to the relevant section of the 2012 OIE TAHC for regaining FMD-free status is found for each type of response below.

The phase and type designations below are guidelines and may be modified by the responsible authorities to best fit the specific outbreak. Descriptors defining different phases and types (for example, small, moderate, and extensive) are intentionally left vague in a recognition that responsible authorities will need to make decisions based on available information regarding specific outbreak characteristics.

PROPOSED PHASES AND TYPES

HEIGHTENED ALERT PHASE: FMD OUTBREAK IN EITHER CANADA OR MEXICO, BUT NOT THE UNITED STATES

FMD in either Canada or Mexico threatens to spread to the United States (Control Areas are near or cross over the U.S. border)

- Discontinue all imports of susceptible animals and animal products from the affected country into the United States.
- Work collaboratively with Canada and/or Mexico to establish Control Areas around Infected Premises and Contact Premises.
- Collaborate with Canada and/or Mexico to implement controlled stop movement of susceptible animals in the Control Area and restrict other movements (vehicles, animal products, etc.) as appropriate (except as permitted by the incident in

[1] Please note that 'type', in this document, only refers to the magnitude of the FMD outbreak and the response. The Federal Emergency Management Agency also uses the word 'type' to describe five levels of complexity for incident response; there is not a relationship between the 'types' discussed here and those FEMA incident management 'types' which refer more specifically to event complexity.

accordance with FAD response and business continuity plans or equivalent plans/permitting processes in place in Canada or Mexico).

- Advise State and Tribal authorities to ensure that their premises ID data is up to date and to be prepared for animal tracing.
- Activate Incident Management Teams as needed.
- Implement an enhanced national FMD surveillance plan for the Control Area(s) and Free Area.
- Collaborate with Canada and/or Mexico to enforce biosecurity protocols within the Control Area.
- Activate the National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) if necessary to deploy assets to support U.S. activities or to assist Canadian or Mexican response efforts.
- Collaborate with Canada and/or Mexico to initiate stamping-out of infected and contact herds.
- Identify the strain(s) of FMD virus (FMDV) and consult with Canada and Mexico to decide whether to activate the North American FMD Vaccine Bank (NAFMDVB).
- Enhance surveillance for FMD at U.S. slaughter plants and ports of entry.
- Conduct tracing and surveillance of cloven-hooved species imported from the FMD affected country within the last two incubation periods (28 days) prior to the date of first infection of the index case.
- Initiate stamping-out of contact herds in the United States (unless the number, or the size, of the herds precludes stamping-out quickly enough to stop disease spread).

Steps to take upon the first case in the US, Canada, or Mexico and to continue for the duration of the outbreak:

- Advise all livestock operations (including auction markets, exhibitions, etc.) in the United States to implement FMD-specific biosecurity plans and continue until freedom from FMD is re-established.
- Emphasize, and enhance enforcement of, requirements for garbage feeding of swine in the United States.
- Allow movement of milk from premises with no evidence of infection with FMDV to processing according to the State, regional, and national Secure Milk Supply (SMS) Plans.
- Allow movement of products from non-susceptible animals (including eggs and egg products) from the Control Area (from premises with no infected susceptible species) into commerce with adequate truck and driver biosecurity for the duration of the outbreak.

PHASE 1

The period of time from the confirmation of the first FMD case in the United States until there is reasonable evidence to estimate the extent of the outbreak. The transition to Phase 2 should be accomplished as soon as possible, with a goal of less than 4 days (96 hours).

- Establish Control Areas around Infected Premises and Contact Premises.
- Activate and deploy appropriate Incident Management Teams.
- Implement controlled stop movement of susceptible animals in the Control Area and restrict other movements in the Control Area (vehicles, etc.) as appropriate (as permitted by specific FMD response and business continuity plans).
- Implement an enhanced national FMD surveillance plan for the Control Area(s) and Free Area.
- Enforce biosecurity protocols within the Control Area.
- Activate the National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) (if local resources have been exhausted).
- Initiate stamping-out of infected and contact herds (unless the number, or the size, of herds precludes stamping-out quickly enough to stop disease spread).
- Identify the strain(s) of FMDV and consult with Canada and Mexico to decide whether to activate the NAFMDVB.
- Activate Joint Information Center and coordinate with public hotlines and media resources.
- Activate state livestock emergency response teams or notify to be on "standby."
- Communicate with State EOCs to partially or fully "stand-up" their operations and activate Multiagency Coordination Groups.

PHASE 2

Surveillance and epidemiology provides timely evidence of the extent of the outbreak (characterized as one of six types) to support planning and decision making by Incident/Area Command.

TYPE 1 - FOCAL FMD OUTBREAK:

Focal area of infection limited to one State or small region with low to moderate livestock numbers on relatively small premises. Epidemiologic investigation and surveillance indicates that it has not spread beyond the initial few premises. The Infected Premises have not had extensive animal movement and are not too large to depopulate quickly. Rapid stamping-out is feasible.

- Continue strict quarantines/movement controls for live animals, vehicles, etc. within the Control Area (movement as permitted by specific Secure Food Supply business continuity plans).
- Continue stamping-out with rapid depopulation, disposal, cleaning, and disinfection of Infected and Contact Premises.
- Design and implement surveillance to obtain data, and then apply to the OIE for recovery of FMD-free status without vaccination. FMD-free status without vaccination may be regained 3 months after the last case if stamping-out or stamping-out with vaccinate-to-kill or vaccinate-to-slaughter strategies are used (OIE TAHC Article 8.5.9).

TYPE 2 – MODERATE REGIONAL FMD OUTBREAK:

A few focal areas of infection limited to a region with low to moderate livestock numbers on small to medium size premises. Depending on animal density, sufficient vaccine and resources can be made available to vaccinate designated susceptible domestic animals to reduce virus transmission. Epidemiologic investigation and surveillance indicate FMDV has not spread beyond the region. The Infected Premises have not had extensive animal movement out of the Control Area and are not too large to depopulate quickly.

- Establish Area Command to coordinate multiple Incident Management Teams in the affected region.
- Continue strict quarantines/movement controls for live animals, vehicles, etc. within the Control Area. Consider allowing movement of non-infected animals (including vaccinates) according to the Secure Food Supply Plans. Animals must meet vaccination withdrawal period (if it applies) and be able to pass FSIS ante-mortem inspection to be slaughtered.
- Continue rapid stamping-out of Infected and Contact Premises.
- Consider establishing a Containment Vaccination Zone and/or Protection Vaccination Zone with eventual depopulation and disposal, or slaughter, of vaccinated animals.
    - **Vaccinate-to-kill:** killing means any procedure which causes the death of an animal that does not enter the human food chain.
    - **Vaccinate-to-slaughter**: slaughter means any procedure which causes the death of an animal by bleeding where the animal may enter the human food chain.
    - **Vaccinate-to-live**: the animal is allowed to live out its useful life-span.
- Officially identify all vaccinated animals for surveillance and monitoring purposes.

- No new vaccinations will be administered more than 28 days after the last known new case of FMD is detected. Design and implement surveillance to obtain data, then apply to the OIE for recovery of FMD-free status. FMD-free status may be attained 3 months after the last case and the slaughter of all vaccinated animals, or 6 months after the last case or the last vaccination if all vaccinated animals are not slaughtered (OIE TAHC Article 8.5.9).

TYPE 3 – LARGE REGIONAL FMD OUTBREAK:

Multiple areas of infection are detected in a region, or the type, number and/or size of infected and contact herds are too great to depopulate quickly enough to suppress disease spread. Depending on the epidemiological situation, there may not be sufficient vaccine and resources available to vaccinate designated susceptible domestic animals to reduce virus transmission. The number of susceptible animals may be too great to consider only a vaccinate-to-kill strategy—a vaccinate-to-slaughter and/or vaccinate-to-live strategy may also be needed. There is a reasonable likelihood that the response strategy, including vaccination, will bring the outbreak under control.

- Establish Area Command to coordinate multiple Incident Management Teams in the affected region.
- Continue strict quarantines/movement control for live animals and vehicles, etc. within the Control Area. Consider allowing movement of non-infected animals (including vaccinates) according to the Secure Food Supply Plans. Animals must meet vaccination withdrawal period (if it applies) and be able to pass FSIS ante-mortem inspection to be slaughtered.
- Stamping-out of Infected and Contact Premises may need to be discontinued. Some Infected and Contact Premises (or severely affected individual animals) may be depopulated based on epidemiologic or humane considerations.
- A vaccinate-to-live policy may be considered to reduce the shedding and spread of the virus.
- Officially identify all vaccinated animals for surveillance and monitoring purposes.
- No new vaccinations will be administered more than 28 days after the last known new case of FMD is detected. Design and implement surveillance to obtain data, then apply to the OIE for recovery of FMD-free status while allowing vaccinated animals to live out their useful lives. If stamping-out was discontinued, FMD-freedom without vaccination may be achieved 12 months after the last case or last vaccination (OIE TAHC Article 8.5.2). If stamping-out was not discontinued FMD free status (without vaccination) may be achieved 6 months after the last case or the last FMD vaccine is administered (OIE TAHC Article 8.5.9).

TYPE 4 – WIDESPREAD OR NATIONAL FMD OUTBREAK:

Widespread areas of infection are detected involving too many herds or herds that are too large to depopulate quickly enough to suppress disease spread. Sufficient vaccine and resources are not available to vaccinate all designated susceptible domestic animals in the affected regions (Control Areas). The number of vaccinated animals is too great to consider a vaccinate-to-kill or slaughter (only) policy. Implement a vaccinate-to-live policy with continued vaccination after the last case to ensure suppression of virus transmission.

- Establish an Area Command in each affected region to coordinate Incident Management Teams within each respective region.
- Stamping-out of Infected and Contact Premises may need to be discontinued. Some Infected and Contact Premises (or severely affected individual animals) may be depopulated based on epidemiologic or humane considerations.
- Implement FMD vaccination strategies as appropriate to reduce the shedding and spread of the virus. The strategy implemented (vaccinate-to-kill, live, or slaughter) may vary by species, region, or be based on other epidemiological considerations and availability of vaccine.
- Consider allowing movement of non-infected animals (including vaccinates) according to the Secure Food Supply Plans. Animals must meet vaccination withdrawal period (if it applies) and be able to pass FSIS ante-mortem inspection to be slaughtered.
- Design and implement surveillance to obtain data, then apply to the OIE for FMD-free with vaccination status, while allowing vaccinated animals to live out their useful lives. FMD-free with vaccination status may be an intermediary step to FMD-freedom without vaccination. If stamping-out was discontinued, FMD-freedom with vaccination can be attained 2 years after the last outbreak as long as there is no evidence of virus circulation within the past 12 months (OIE TAHC Article 8.5.3). If vaccination is stopped, FMD-free status may be attained 12 months after the last evidence of FMD infection and the last FMD vaccine was administered (OIE TAHC Article 8.5.2).

TYPE 5 – CATASTROPHIC FMD OUTBREAK:

Widespread areas of infection are detected involving a large portion of the United States. Sufficient vaccine and resources are not available to quickly vaccinate all designated susceptible animals in the affected regions. The number of animals is too great to consider only a vaccinate-to-kill or vaccinate-to-slaughter strategy in isolation. Vaccinate-to-kill, vaccinate-to-slaughter, and vaccinate-to-live policies may need to be implemented for

regions and species, as vaccine availability dictates. It becomes apparent that FMD is widespread, and will not be eradicated within a year.

- Transition to a program for long-term eradication and control, including vaccinate-to-live.
- Severely affected individual animals may be depopulated based on epidemiologic or humane considerations.
- Transition to allowing movement of vaccinated animals (14 days post-vaccination) from premises with no current clinical evidence of infection with FMDV.
- Consider allowing movement of non-infected animals (including vaccinates) according to the Secure Food Supply Plans. Animals must meet vaccination withdrawal period (if it applies) and be able to pass FSIS ante-mortem inspection to be slaughtered.
- Implement a comprehensive FMD vaccination program once sufficient vaccine becomes available.
- FMD-free status will not be able to be established until the long term control and eradication program is successful. FMD-free with vaccination status may be an intermediary step to FMD-freedom without vaccination. FMD-free status (with vaccination) can be attained 2 years after the last outbreak as long as there is no evidence of virus circulation within the past 12 months (OIE TAHC Article 8.5.3). If vaccination is stopped, FMD-free status may be attained 12 months after the last evidence of FMD infection and the last FMD vaccine was administered (OIE TAHC Article 8.5.2).

TYPE 6 - NORTH AMERICAN FMD OUTBREAK:

Widespread areas of infection are detected involving a large portion of the United States, Canada, and/or Mexico. Sufficient vaccine and resources are not available to quickly vaccinate all designated susceptible animals in the affected regions/countries. The number of vaccinated animals is too great to consider a vaccinate-to-kill policy. It becomes apparent that FMD is widespread, and will not be eradicated within a year.

- Implement the same steps as a Type 5 outbreak. In addition:
    - Work with officials in Canada and Mexico to implement a North American plan for animal and animal product movement.
    - Work with officials in Canada and Mexico to implement a comprehensive North American FMD control program, including vaccination once sufficient vaccine becomes available.
    - FMD-free status will not be able to be established until the long term control and eradication program is successful. FMD-free with vaccination status may

be an intermediary step to FMD-freedom without vaccination. FMD-free status (with vaccination) can be attained 2 years after the last outbreak as long as there is no evidence of virus circulation within the past 12 months (OIE TAHC Article 8.5.3). If vaccination is stopped, FMD-free status may be attained 12 months after the last evidence of FMD infection and the last FMD vaccine was administered (OIE TAHC Article 8.5.2).

PHASE 3

Recovery: Surveillance and epidemiologic evidence indicates that the outbreak is under control and a plan is implemented to regain FMD-free status (possibly with vaccination).

PHASE 4

The United States is declared free of FMD (possibly with vaccination). The USDA continues to work to convince trading partners to accept U.S. exports of animals and animal products.

VISUALIZING PHASES AND TYPES



Types of FMD Outbreaks



Differentiating between Types of FMD Outbreaks

Outbreak Type	Geographic Size of Outbreak	Animal Movement	Number of Premises	Size of Premises	Vaccine Assumptions	Appropriate Strategies	Minimum Time Required to Achieve FMD Free Status*
Type 1-Focal FMD outbreak	One state or small region	No extensive animal movement	Small number	Relatively small	Not applicable	Stamping-out	FMD-freedom without vaccination: 3 months after the last case
Type 2-Moderate regional FMD outbreak	Few focal areas in one region	No extensive animal movement out of the Control Area	Small to moderate number	Small to medium	Sufficient vaccine **MAY NOT BE** available to vaccinate designated animals (depending on animal density and strain)	Stamping-out Vaccinate-to-kill Vaccinate-to-slaughter Discontinue vaccination 28 days after the last case	FMD-freedom without vaccination: 3 months after the last case and slaughter of all vaccinated animals, or 6 months after last case or last vaccination if all vaccinated animals are not slaughtered
Type 3-Large regional FMD outbreak	Multiple areas in a region	No extensive animal movement outside of the region	Moderate number	Medium to large	Sufficient vaccine is **NOT** available to vaccinate designated animals	Vaccinate-to-live Vaccinate-to-slaughter Discontinue vaccination 28 days after the last case	If stamping-out was discontinued, FMD-freedom without vaccination: 12 months after the last case or last vaccination (OIE TAHC Article 8.5.2). If stamping-out was not discontinued, FMD freedom without vaccination: 6 months after last case or last vaccination if all vaccinated animals are not slaughtered
Type 4-Widespread or national FMD outbreak	Widespread areas of infection	Extensive animal movement	Moderate to large number	Medium to large	Sufficient vaccine is **NOT** available to vaccinate designated animals	Vaccinate-to-live Vaccinate-to-slaughter Continue vaccination after the last case	FMD- freedom with vaccination may be intermediary step; If stamping-out was discontinued, FMD-freedom with vaccination can be attained 2 years after the last outbreak as long as there is no evidence of virus circulation within the past 12 months (OIE TAHC Article 8.5.3)
Type 5-Catastrophic FMD outbreak	Widespread areas of infection	Extensive animal movement	Large number	Large	Sufficient vaccine is **NOT** available to vaccinate designated animals	**Endemic FMD control program** Vaccinate-to-live Continue vaccination after the last case	FMD-free with vaccination status may be an intermediary step to FMD-free without vaccination. FMD-freedom with vaccination: 2 years after last outbreak with no evidence of virus circulation within 12 months. FMD-freedom without vaccination: 12 months after last FMD vaccine administered
Type 6-North American FMD outbreak	Widespread infection in Mexico/ Canada/US	Extensive animal movement	Large number	Large	Sufficient vaccine is **NOT** available to vaccinate designated animals	**Endemic FMD control program** Vaccinate-to-live Continue vaccination after the last case	FMD-free with vaccination status may be an intermediary step to FMD-free without vaccination. FMD-freedom with vaccination: 2 years after last outbreak with no evidence of virus circulation within 12 months. FMD-freedom without vaccination: 12 months after last FMD vaccine administered

Vaccinate-to-kill; killing means any procedure which causes the death of an animal that does not enter the human food chain.
Vaccinate-to-slaughter; slaughter means any procedure which causes the death of an animal by bleeding where the animal may enter the human food chain.
Vaccinate-to-live: the animal is allowed to live out its useful life span.
***Actual time to regain export markets will likely be longer.**

Responding to Different Types of FMD Outbreaks

	Incident Management	Quarantine & Movement Control	Surveillance for Recovery of Freedom	Implementation of selected response strategy	Vaccination
Type 1-Focal FMD outbreak	Establish Incident Command.	Continue strict quarantine and movement control for live animals, animal products, and vehicles within the Control Area (movement as permitted by specific Secure Food Supply Plans).	Implement surveillance to prove recovery of FMD-free status. FMD-free status may be regained 3 months after last case (OIE TAHC).	Continue stamping-out with rapid depopulation, disposal, cleaning, and disinfection of Infected and Contact Premises.	Order FMD vaccine. Determine if vaccination is appropriate, depending on epidemiological situation; evaluate if vaccination will be required if outbreak grows into Type 2.
Type 2-Moderate regional FMD outbreak	Establish Area Command to coordinate multiple Incident Management Teams in the affected region.	Continue strict quarantine and movement control for live animals, vehicles, etc. Consider allowing movement of non-infected animals (including vaccinates) according to the Secure Food Supply Plans.	Implement surveillance to prove recovery of FMD-free status. FMD-free status can be attained 3 months after the last case and the slaughter of all vaccinated animals or 6 months after the last case or last vaccination if all vaccinated animals are not slaughtered (OIE TAHC).	Continue stamping-out, as appropriate; consider initiating vaccinate-to-kill and vaccinate-to-slaughter strategies.	Establish Vaccination Zones if vaccination is going to be used. No new vaccination will be administered more than 28 days after the last new case of FMD is detected. Healthy vaccinated livestock with no current clinical evidence of infection may move to slaughter after vaccine withdrawal period.

	Incident Management	Quarantine & Movement Control	Surveillance for Recovery of Freedom	Implementation of selected response strategy	Vaccination
Type 3-Large regional FMD outbreak	Establish Area Command to coordinate multiple Incident Management Teams in the affected region.	Continue strict quarantine and movement control for live animals, vehicles, etc. Consider allowing movement of non-infected animals (including vaccinates) according to the Secure Food Supply Plans.	Implement surveillance to prove recovery of FMD-free status. If stamping-out was discontinued, FMD freedom without vaccination can be achieved 12 months after last case or last vaccination. If stamping-out was not discontinued, FMD freedom without vaccination can be achieved 6 months after last case or last vaccination if all vaccinated animals are not slaughtered.	**Stamping-out** of Infected and Contact Premises may need to be discontinued; some Infected and Contact Premises may be depopulated based on epidemiologic or humane considerations. Initiate vaccinate-to-live policy.	Establish Vaccination Zones. No new vaccination will be administered more than 28 days after the last new case of FMD is detected. Healthy vaccinated livestock with no current clinical evidence of infection may move to slaughter after vaccine withdrawal period.

	Incident Management	Quarantine & Movement Control	Surveillance for Recovery of Freedom	Implementation of selected response strategy	Vaccination
Type 4-Widespread or national FMD outbreak	Establish an Area Command in each affected region to coordinate Incident Management Teams within their respective regions.	Consider allowing movement of non-infected animals (including vaccinates) according to the Secure Food Supply Plans.	Implement surveillance to prove recovery of FMD freedom, FMD freedom with vaccination may be intermediary step; If stamping-out was discontinued, FMD-freedom with vaccination can be attained 2 years after the last outbreak as long as there is no evidence of virus circulation within the past 12 months.	**Stamping-out** of Infected and Contact Premises may need to be discontinued; some Infected and Contact Premises may be depopulated based on epidemiologic or humane considerations. Implement a vaccinate-to-live policy with continued vaccination after the last case to ensure suppression of virus transmission.	Establish Vaccination Zones. Vaccinate-to-live with continued vaccination after the last case to ensure suppression of virus transmission. Healthy vaccinated livestock with no current clinical evidence of infection may move to slaughter after vaccine withdrawal period.
Type 5-Catastrophic FMD outbreak	Transition to a long term control and eradication program.	Transition to allowing movement of vaccinated animals (14 days post-vaccination) from premises with no current clinical evidence of infection with FMDV. Consider allowing movement of non-infected animals (including vaccinates) according to the Secure Food Supply Plans.	If and when appropriate, implement surveillance to prove that the long-term control and eradication program is successful (with or without vaccination).	**Some** animals may be depopulated based on epidemiologic or humane considerations. Implement a vaccinate-to-live policy, continued after the last case; vaccine use will need to be prioritized.	Prioritize regions and herds to receive the limited vaccine. Vaccinate-to-live with continued vaccination in long term control program to ensure suppression of virus transmission. Healthy vaccinated livestock with no current clinical evidence of infection may move to slaughter after vaccine withdrawal period.

	Incident Management	Quarantine & Movement Control	Surveillance for Recovery of Freedom	Implementation of selected response strategy	Vaccination
Type 6-North American FMD outbreak	[see Type 5] Work with officials in Canada and Mexico to implement a comprehensive North American FMD control program, including vaccination.	[see Type 5] Work with officials in Canada and Mexico to implement a North American plan for animal and animal product movement.	If and when appropriate, implement surveillance to prove that long-term control and eradication program is successful in each of the countries (with or without vaccination).	[see Type 5]	[see Type 5]

OIE Definition of Stamping-Out

Means carrying out under the authority of the Veterinary Authority, on confirmation of a disease, the killing of the animals which are affected and those suspected of being affected in the herd and, where appropriate, those in other herds which have been exposed to infection by direct animal to animal contact, or by indirect contact of a kind likely to cause the transmission of the causal pathogen. All susceptible animals, vaccinated or unvaccinated, on an infected premises should be killed and their carcasses destroyed by burning or burial, or by any other method which will eliminate the spread of infection through the carcasses or products of the animals killed.

This policy should be accompanied by the cleansing and disinfection procedures defined in the Terrestrial Code.

The term modified stamping-out policy should be used in communications to the OIE whenever the above animal health measures are not implemented in full and details of the modifications should be given.

Acknowledgements

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