

# OVERVIEW OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE MOVEMENT DECISIONS DURING A FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE OUTBREAK IN THE U.S.

MARCH 1, 2024

[Framework for Interstate and Intrastate Movement During a FMD Outbreak in the U.S.](https://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/emergency-response/fmd-framework-for-interstate-movement/)

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The *Framework for Interstate and Intrastate Movement Decisions During a Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak in the U.S.* (FMD Framework) is the result of a two-year effort to build consensus and develop criteria for making animal movement decisions in the event of a Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak in the United States. The document provides a framework for discussion between and among Responsible Regulatory Officials (Federal, State, Tribal, territorial) and industry to provide optimal protection from the introduction of foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus to a new area during an outbreak while maintaining business continuity for livestock producers and associated industries to the extent possible, and safe and wholesome food to consumers. The document focuses on interstate and intrastate movement decisions by State Animal Health Officials; however, the recommendations may also be useful for movement decisions by producers and packers. *The recommendations in this document are guidelines only; Responsible Regulatory Officials will make decisions based on available information and resources at the time of the outbreak.*

**Major concepts proposed include a Limited Movement Period of 28 days following a 72-hour National Movement Standstill, approaches to reducing risks associated with movements, and the use of State Status to guide movement decisions.**

## BACKGROUND INFORMATION


- At the beginning of an FMD outbreak in the U.S., the USDA plans to order a 72-hour movement standstill of all susceptible livestock. Livestock already on trucks and in transit will be allowed to proceed to their intended destination (with some exceptions). Animals at meat harvest facilities should be processed on schedule. Animals at auction markets, fairs, exhibitions or other aggregation points will be handled on a case-by-case basis to minimize chances of spreading infection from infected but undetected animals.
- When the first case of FMD is detected in the U.S., it must be assumed that there may also be undetected cases of FMD. The USDA FMD Red Book states that Control Areas will be set up around each infected premises (10 km radius minimum). The Control Areas are needed to monitor and limit the local spread of the FMD virus. However, extensive animal and other movements from premises occur daily that may spread the FMD virus long distances before the premises is known to be infected. Other FMDV-infected premises could potentially be anywhere in the U.S.
- State Animal Health Officials (SAHOs) are responsible for managing the risk of FMD introduction and spread in their state while maintaining animal welfare, food security, and business continuity to the extent possible. This is a difficult balance to achieve. The production animal industry is responsible for monitoring their animals for clinical signs of FMD and protecting them from infection with FMD virus.
- The FAD PRoP Strategy Document: Classification of Phases and Types of an FMD Outbreak and Response presents guidelines for classifying the type of FMD outbreak on a national scale to facilitate response planning. It will be very important to try to control the outbreak before it becomes a Type 3 Large Regional outbreak when it may be necessary to allow some FMD-infected herds to recover and to implement vaccination-to-live.

## SUMMARY OF MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT AN FMD OUTBREAK FROM BECOMING A TYPE 3 OR MORE EXTENSIVE EVENT


### TERMINOLOGY CHANGE

Areas outside of Control Areas are currently considered Free Areas. This designation indicates that animals are free from regulatory movement restrictions imposed by the Unified Incident Command (UIC). It does not mean that they are free of FMDV. In the Framework document, **all areas of the U.S. outside of the Control Area are referred to as “Observation Areas” rather than Free Areas.** These areas will be monitored for FMD by producers, farm workers, veterinarians, and federal and state inspectors at meat harvest facilities.

A. Current Zones and Areas




B. Proposed Zones and Areas



### LIMITED MOVEMENT PERIOD

**Only essential low-risk movements should be allowed outside of Control Areas for the first 28 days (two maximum FMD incubation periods) after the standstill ends.** This 28-day Limited Movement Period should apply nationally to all interstate and intrastate movements of susceptible animals. Producers accepting animals into their herds during this period are taking a chance that they may introduce FMD into their operation. The 72-hour standstill and the 28-day Limited Movement Period provide the best opportunity to find all infected premises, end the FMD outbreak, and return the U.S. to FMD free status. **The Limited Movement Period enables FMD to be detected before large-scale/widespread movements resume.**



## APPROACHES TO REDUCING RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH MOVEMENT

**Movements that are considered essential and low-risk would be allowed during and after the 28-day Limited Movement Period.** The UIC and SAHOs can decide which movements are essential and low-risk during the Limited Movement Period. High-risk movements should be avoided during the Limited Movement Period and perhaps longer depending on the epidemiology of the outbreak. Movements not on either list should only be allowed after review and approval by the shipping and receiving premises and the SAHOs in the shipping and receiving states. Ultimately, it is up to the SAHOs and producers to determine what they consider to be essential movements and low-risk movements.

### ESSENTIAL LOW-RISK MOVEMENTS

The following movements (either intrastate or interstate) could be considered essential low-risk movements at the end of the 72-hour standstill and should be allowed without the need for an FMD-related permit:

- Movement of animals outside of a Control Area to a meat harvest facility
- Movement of animals in a biosecure building to another biosecure building (according to the Secure Food Supply plans) if it is essential to move the animals for welfare purposes.
- Movement of animals from an isolated location (e.g., pasture, lot, or building) to another location without exposure to new animals if it is essential for welfare purposes.

Permission for other intrastate or interstate movements during the Limited Movement Period should be requested from the SAHO by providing documentation that the movement is essential and is low-risk.

### HIGH-RISK MOVEMENTS THAT SHOULD NOT OCCUR UNTIL THE EXTENT OF THE FMD OUTBREAK IS KNOWN

The following movements should be considered high-risk movements and should be avoided during the Limited Movement Period, and perhaps longer depending on the epidemiology of the outbreak:

- Any movements of animals to animal aggregation sites such as markets, fairs, exhibitions, shows, etc.
- Any movements of animals that are not immune due to vaccination, or in a biosecure environment to premises where they will be exposed to other FMD-susceptible animals (e.g., Feedlot, backgrounder, dairy, breeding operation, etc.).


**Reducing the potential for spreading FMDV in the Observation Area is the responsibility of livestock owners with guidance from state and federal authorities and their herd veterinarians.** In the first 28 days following the end of the 72-hour standstill, and possibly longer, livestock owners and managers can protect their animals by limiting the movement of animals and associated items to only essential and low-risk movements. The risk of accepting FMD-infected but undetected animals into an operation is borne primarily by the animal owners, the animals on the premises, and the livestock industry. It is up to the SAHOs and producers to determine what they consider to be essential movements and low-risk movements.

**Another means to reduce the risk of moving FMD-infected, but undetected animals in the Observation Area throughout the outbreak is to request that animals be FMD-Checked before movement.**

<b>METHODS FOR DESIGNATING LIVESTOCK AS “FMD-CHECKED.”</b> (All statements documenting FMD-Checked status must be in writing and signed)	
Herd owner/manager signed statement	Category 2 accredited veterinarian signed statement
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The premises has met the requirements of the relevant secure food supply plan for at least two incubation periods (28 days) before animals are moved to another production site.</li> </ul> <p><b>OR</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Active observational surveillance has been conducted daily for at least two incubation periods (28 days) before movement with no unusual incidence of clinical signs consistent with FMDV infection.</li> </ul> <p><b>OR</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The animals have been housed in a biosecure environment or in an isolated location away from other livestock for at least two incubation periods (28 days) and do not have an unusual incidence of clinical signs associated with FMD.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An accredited veterinarian has observed the livestock within two days of movement, and they have not been observed to have an unusual incidence of clinical signs consistent with FMDV infection.</li> </ul> <p><b>AND</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Active observational surveillance has been conducted daily since the accredited veterinarian observed the animals.</li> </ul>
Animals exhibiting clinical signs compatible with FMD must be reported to the SAHO. The SAHO may order sampling and testing at a NAHLN laboratory for FMDV by PCR. Sampling may be conducted under the authority of a trained, accredited veterinarian, with the SAHO’s permission. The Animals are quarantined until a negative result is returned. Documentation of any testing and receipt of negative results must accompany any statements documenting an FMD-checked designation.	

## USE OF STATE STATUS TO GUIDE MOVEMENT DECISIONS

The Framework proposes a classification of states according to FMD status during a national phase 2 of an FMD outbreak (USDA FMD Red Book). In Level 1 (Stamping out) or Level 2 (Stamping out with vaccination to kill) FMD-affected states' decisions on animal movement should be based on the status of the area (Control Area or Observation Area) rather than the status of the state. An Observation Area in a Level 1 or Level 2 affected state should not be considered to be at a higher risk for unknown FMD infection than an Observation Area in a state not affected by FMDV. However, an entire Level 3 FMD affected State (Vaccinated to Live with No Stamping Out) should be considered a higher risk for FMD-infected but undetected animals than Level 1 or Level 2 affected states.



## HARVEST FACILITY CONSIDERATIONS

**A meat harvest facility in a state with no detections of FMD that receives FMD-positive animals from out of state should not result in the state being designated as an FMD-affected state** (*Note: A meat harvest facility is a facility that is Federally inspected, State inspected, or is Custom Exempt*). A Control Area should be established at the perimeter of the meat harvest facility until the facility undergoes cleaning and disinfection for FMDV. Once cleaning and disinfection are completed and as long as the facility is not in a Control Area established due to infected production premises, the Control Area around the facility could be lifted, and the facility could return to operation. This is consistent with the plans in the ASF Red Book for managing situations where African Swine Fever (ASF) positive animals are received at meat harvest facilities.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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