Managed Movement of Susceptible Livestock Species during a U.S. Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Outbreak: Overview

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Introduction
Movement restrictions of susceptible livestock species is one strategy for the control and containment of FMD during a U.S. outbreak. A 72-hour national movement standstill has been recommended by USDA during state/national exercises. Livestock operations affected by movement restrictions yet not infected with FMD will need to restart movement as soon as possible to support business continuity in a way that is consistent with mitigating the risk of spreading FMD. The Secure Food Supply (SFS) Plans for Continuity of Business are for operations with no evidence of FMD infection located in a Control Area to prepare to meet movement permit requirements while reducing the risk of spreading the FMD virus. Numerous states have made progress in pre-planning movement restrictions and permitting in the event of an FMD outbreak.

Phases of Livestock Movement Restrictions
FMD response strategies will be assessed and adjusted as the outbreak progresses and will depend on specific outbreak characteristics (see Figure 1).

Managing movements of susceptible livestock species during an FMD outbreak could be approached similarly to the management of air traffic immediately following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The Federal Aviation Administration issued a “national ground stop” – planes in the air were safely landed at the nearest airport and no new flights were initiated. Some commercial flights were allowed to resume in an orderly way three days later, with enhanced safety protocols in place and under heightened security. Early in an FMD disease outbreak, movement restrictions may be implemented that will “land” shipments of livestock in transit and “ground” any new movements until the extent of the outbreak can be characterized, and movements of susceptible livestock can resume under heightened biosecurity.

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1 The term “movement restrictions” encompasses the language and implementation differences among federal movement recommendations and state plans.
2 For more information regarding movement permit guidance for cattle or pigs, see: http://securebeef.org/regulatory-officials/permit-guidance/ or http://www.securepork.org/regulatory-officials/permit-guidance/
Phase 1 – Initial Response Actions

- State-specific movement restrictions extending beyond a Control Area may be issued.
- Enhanced biosecurity practices and disease monitoring are encouraged for all premises and movements.
- Considerations for livestock in transit:
  - Communicate next steps with transporters.
  - Return to origin if livestock originated from an infected, suspect, or contact premises.
  - If return is not possible or the destination will not accept livestock, identify an acceptable diversion quarantine site established by the state. Make plans for abandoned animals (unable to return or continue).
  - Length of transport time for the animals and driver must be considered.

Phase 2 – Restarting Movement

The following applies to all livestock with no evidence of FMD infection:

- Any livestock movement in a Control Area, regardless of its destination, will require a valid permit once movement is allowed to restart.
- The origin premises must meet permitting requirements, AND ensure the receiving premises is willing to accept the livestock, AND comply with the destination state requirements for all interstate movements.

Outside of a Control Area

Livestock movements outside of a Control Area should be allowed provided the movements can be completed without passing through a Control Area.

Into or Within a Control Area

Livestock moving directly to slaughter from a premises outside a Control Area to a packing plant inside a Control Area should be allowed with no additional disease monitoring requirements as ante- and post-mortem inspection processes currently in place at inspected packing plants should be sufficient. Packing plants within the Control Area may consider preferentially harvesting animals from within the Control Area to decrease the number of susceptible animals at risk of contracting FMD.

Non-terminal movements of livestock into a Control Area are strongly discouraged as they will increase the population of susceptible animals and risk providing additional “fuel” to the outbreak.

Out of a Control Area

Livestock moving directly to slaughter may be required to follow a pre-determined transportation route and comply with biosecurity protocols in order to minimize risk of exposing susceptible animals to the virus.

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Additional Resources

- Secure Beef Supply: www.securebeef.org
- Secure Pork Supply: www.securepork.org
- Secure Milk Supply: www.securemilk.org
- Secure Sheep and Wool Supply: www.securesheepwool.org