07.20.05 : Senate Testimony
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE UNITED STATES
SENATE COMMITTEE
ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY
Wednesday, July 20, 2005
Presented by James
A. Roth, DVM, PhD, Director, Center for Food Security and
Public
Health, Iowa State University, College of Veterinary Medicine,
Ames, Iowa
Chairman Chambliss, Senator Harkin and members of the Senate
Committee on Agriculture Nutrition, and Forestry, thank you
for holding this important hearing today and for the opportunity
to testify before you. I am the director of the Center for
Food Security and Public Health. Our mission is to increase
national preparedness for accidental or intentional introduction
of disease agents which threaten food security or public
health.
U.S. agriculture is highly vulnerable to the accidental
or intentional introduction of foreign and emerging animal
diseases. Many of these diseases are zoonotic (they also
infect people) and can cause serious public health problems,
including loss of life. Diseases that affect both animals
and people are more difficult to control. In recent years,
there have been numerous examples of accidental introductions
of foreign animal and zoonotic diseases worldwide. Because
agriculture accounts for 13% of the U.S. gross domestic product
and 18% of domestic employment, an outbreak of a foreign
animal or zoonotic disease could be devastating to the US
economy. This makes agriculture an attractive target for
terrorists.
Animal agriculture is also threatened by the potential bioterrorism
agents, since nearly all of them are zoonotic. Agents against
animals have been considered as a component of nearly every
nation-sponsored offensive biowarfare program. The U.S. is
not adequately prepared to respond to animal agricultural
issues, companion animal issues, or wildlife issues in bioterrorism
events. Concerns about the level of preparedness for accidental
or intentional introduction of diseases have been identified
by individuals at all levels of federal and state governments
and by animal industry and public health officials.
Since the outbreak of foot and mouth
disease in the U.K. in 2000, the events of September 11,
2001, and the anthrax bioterrorism event, the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
have worked to increase preparedness for disease outbreaks.
Significant progress is being made. The national animal ID
system is being developed, expert working groups have been
convened to establish research and vaccine development priorities,
a number of states have organized or are working to organize
animal emergency response teams, veterinary diagnostic laboratories
are networking to enhance the national capacity and to better
share information, and Congress has nearly completed funding
for the modernization of the National Centers for Animal
Health in Ames, Iowa.
Despite the progress, the U.S. continues to have inadequate
infrastructure for prevention, detection, response and recovery
for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD 9), Defense of U.S. Agriculture
and Food, issued on January 30, 2004 addressed some of the
challenges and needs. However, funding to implement a number
of critically important items in the Directive has not been
made available.
The significant challenges that I will focus the rest of
my testimony on are the vulnerabilities and needs I consider
the most important for protecting public health, animal health,
and U.S. agriculture from disease threats. These priorities
include the rapid development of vaccines and anti-virals
for high priority foreign and zoonotic diseases; correcting
major deficiencies in the physical capacity for animal health
research and disease diagnosis in the U.S.; and strengthening
the human resources needed to prevent, prepare for, respond
to, and recover from a devastating foreign animal or zoonotic
disease event.
In 2003, two expert panels were convened by the Federal government
to assess the threat from animal pathogens that could be
used by bioterrorists or agroterrorists, and to establish
research and development needs to reduce the threat from
these agents. The Interagency
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Counter Measures Working
Group – Animal Pathogens
Research and Development Subgroup (2003) and a White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) Agroterrorism
Countermeasures Blue Ribbon Panel (Dec 2003), identified
10 animal diseases to be of highest priority for vaccine
and anti-viral research and development: foot and mouth disease,
Rift Valley fever, highly pathogenic avian influenza, Nipah/Hendra,
exotic Newcastle disease, classical swine fever, African
swine fever, Venezuelan and eastern equine encephalitis,
and rinderpest. The expert groups recommended significant
investments in vaccine and anti-viral research and development
to mitigate the threat from these agents.
HSPD 9 calls for the creation of a National Veterinary Stockpile
(NVS) containing significant amounts of animal vaccine, antiviral
or therapeutic products to appropriately respond to the most
damaging animal diseases affecting human health and the economy.
The NVS should be capable of deploying vaccines within 24
hours of an outbreak. Rift Valley fever (RVF), Nipah virus,
and avian influenza are especially significant threats because
of their contagious nature and the fact that they can cause
serious illness and death in humans. Sufficient data exists
to demonstrate that safe and effective vaccines for these
three diseases can be developed in a short time frame. A
relatively modest investment could result in the development
and production of vaccines for these three diseases for the
NVS. This preventive measure would effectively reduce the
serious threat these diseases pose to both public health
and animal agriculture.
Animal vaccines can be developed for a small fraction of
the cost of developing human vaccines, and can be approved
for use much quicker and with less risk than human vaccines.
Vaccinating animals for zoonotic diseases effectively protects
the human population from infection, and reduces the need
to vaccinate people. This results in huge cost savings and
avoids the safety concerns associated with vaccinating people.
Project
Bioshield calls for $5.6 billion over a 10 year period
for the development of vaccines and therapeutics for use
in humans. A portion of that funding should be designated
to develop vaccines and other preventatives for animal diseases
with zoonotic importance. This will effectively reduce exposure
of humans to these diseases, provide protection much sooner
than is possible through the development of human vaccines,
and reduce the need to vaccinate humans.
The core of the federal government’s scientists, support
staff and laboratories dedicated to research and diagnosis
of foreign animal diseases that threaten U.S. livestock are
currently located at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center
on Plum Island, NY. These facilities are operated by the
Department of Homeland Security and staffed by USDA scientists
responsible for research and diagnostic activities. The Plum
Island Animal Disease Center does not have adequate capacity
for the foreign animal disease research and diagnostic needs
of the nation. This lack of capacity is recognized by the
USDA, the Department of Homeland Security, the American Veterinary
Medical Association (AVMA), the Association of American Veterinary
Medical Colleges (AAVMC), the U.S. Animal Health Association
and other groups. Planning should begin immediately for replacement
of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center facilities and funding
for new facilities should be appropriated as soon as possible.
Additional biosafety level 3 agriculture (BL3 Ag) and biosafety
level 4 (BL4) facilities for animal health research are urgently
needed. There are no BL4 facilities for livestock disease
research in the U.S. I am currently coordinating a project
to develop a vaccine for the Nipah virus, a BL4 pathogen
which causes serious illness and death in pigs and in people.
Our collaborators in Canada are using their BL4 facility
to test the vaccine in pigs because the U.S. does not have
facilities for this research in food animal species.
Veterinarians are an integral part of the nation’s
public health system. Nearly all of the biological agents
that pose the highest risk to national security cause diseases
that are transmitted from animals to man; veterinarians have
expertise in diagnosing, preventing and controlling these
types of diseases. There is a serious and acute shortage
of veterinarians in rural agricultural areas, federal government
agencies, and in disciplines such as public health and food
safety. There is also a critical shortage of DVM, PhD research
scientists and teachers to train future scientists, especially
in high priority areas of veterinary infectious diseases.
The National
Veterinary Medical Service Act was signed by President Bush in December 2003
in recognition of the severe shortage of food animal veterinarians
in rural areas. The Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture
to “conduct
a loan repayment program regarding the provision of veterinary
services in shortage situations, and for other purposes.” However,
there is no funding to support this Act. Approximately $20
million per year is needed for this program.
In May 2005, U.S. Senator Wayne
Allard of Colorado introduced S. 914, the Veterinary
Workforce Expansion Act of 2005 (VWEA). The proposed legislation
would establish a grant program to expand capacity in veterinary
medical schools, and increase the number of veterinarians
working in public health practice and biomedical research.
The VWEA would amend the Public Health Service Act to create
a competitive grant program for schools and institutions
to increase both their training capacity and their ability
to research high-priority diseases. Veterinary colleges
are a critical national resource but are only supported
by 27 states. The nation’s professional
veterinary education capacity has not changed appreciably
in 20 years and it has been nearly 30 years since the federal
government has provided general funding for veterinary medical
colleges. Studies by the AAVMC have shown that approximately
350 additional students are needed each year in order to
maintain the current ratio of nine incoming veterinary students
per million people. The AAVMC and the AVMA are supporting
this pending legislation.
Funding of the National Veterinary Medical Services Act
and the Veterinary Workforce Expansion Act of 2005 is critical
to developing the human resources needed for foreign animal
and zoonotic disease defense.
Additional funds should be made available for advanced training
of veterinarians in infectious disease related disciplines.
A 2003 (AAVMC) survey found 149 vacant positions in veterinary
pathology, with a projected shortage of 60 veterinary pathologists
per year, and 200 vacancies for DVMs in the USDA-Food Safety
Inspection Service.
In summary, progress has been made in increasing our preparedness
for agroterrorism events and incursions of foreign animal
and zoonotic diseases, but much remains to be done. Vaccines
and anti-virals for high priority foreign animal and zoonotic
diseases should be developed as quickly as possible and placed
in the National Veterinary Stockpile. Planning should begin
immediately for replacement of the Plum Island Animal Disease
Center facilities with the addition of BL4 facilities for
domestic animal research, and funding for these facilities
should be appropriated as soon as possible. In order to develop
the human resources needed for foreign animal and zoonotic
disease defense; funds should be appropriated for the National
Veterinary Medical Services Act and the Veterinary Workforce
Expansion Act of 2005.
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